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programs, this cooperation not only reduces the emotional
heat in their collective bargaining; it encourages them to
experiment with new ways o f resolving problems.
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William Foote Whyte and Jennie Farley
UNION-MANAGEMENT COOPERATION
h e  U n i t e d  St a t e s  so f a r  h a s  p r o d u c e d  no 
national system of union-management cooperation. 
To some supporters of cooperation, this may seem 
a serious deficiency. On the other hand, the emergence 
here and there over the years of a variety of company 
or local systems makes it possible for practitioners 
and researchers to determine what system or systems work best in 
our country or in certain local areas. Here we shall focus on the his­
tory of these developments, concentrating particularly on the period 
from the 1940s to the 1990s.
Let us begin with the National Planning Association (NPA) stud­
ies entitled Causes of Industrial Peace under Collective Bargaining.
In the 1940s, the NPA, a private not-for-profit organization in which 
some prominent union leaders and management officials and stu­
dents of industrial relations participated, carried out a series of 13 
case studies. In 1933, the NPA issued Fundamentals of Labor Peace:
A Final Report, written by some of the leaders in industrial relations 
research of the 1940s and 1950s: Clinton S. Golden of the United 
Steelworkers, chairman of the committee conducting the studies, 
Clark Kerr, John T. Dunlop, Douglas McGregor, Frederick H. 
Harbison, and Charles A. Myers.
In the final report, the authors arrive at this overall evaluation
(p. 6):
It is clearly evident that there are relative degrees o f industrial peace. 
These range from a precarious equilibrium of mutually hostile forces for 
a stated period o f tim e—the life o f an agreement—to an enduring, har­
monious, and cooperative relationship o f a really creative character. 
Under presently existing conditions, neither o f the extremes represents 
the typical. There is some evidence, though, that we are moving from the 
first in the direction o f the second, which may be thought o f as the ideal, 
(italics in original)
Let us see to what extent the trend predicted in the 1950s has 
materialized in the 1980s and 1990s. The authors never define what 
they mean when referring to a relationship of a really “creative char­
acter.” We shall provide our own definition in distinguishing be­
tween a conventional relationship in which the parties are generally 
able to resolve their differences through collective bargaining and 
one in which the parties have found new and more effective ways 
of organizing the work and jointly solving their human and techni­
cal problems.
By separating union-management cooperation from collective bar­
gaining, we do not mean to imply that they have no relationship to each 
other. On the contrary, the nature of that relationship is one of our 
principal concerns, which we shall explore further as we review the his­
tory of cooperative efforts from 1940 to the 1990s.
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Precursors
During World War I, the government sought to foster cooperation, but 
after the war, as conservative governments took over, cooperative 
arrangements declined. Nevertheless, some American Federation of 
Labor Unions were active in working with employers to help the firm 
to survive in the face of challenges from non-union firms. For exam­
ple, “ Through loans and technical assistance to manufacturers hover­
ing on the brink of insolvency, the Amalgamated Clothing Workers 
saved the jobs of thousands of workers who would otherwise have 
been thrown upon the streets” (McKelvey, 1952:124). It should be 
noted, however, that job security for remaining workers was gained at 
the expense of those being laid off by technical and organizational 
changes in the industry (see Perlman and Taft, 1935: 587-88). The 
union leaders believed that more jobs would have been lost to non­
union firms without this union-supported modernization program.
In the 1940s, the International Ladies Garment Workers Union 
(ILGWU) pursued a similar strategy, under the leadership of William 
Gomberg, director of the Management Engineering Department.
With his influential book A Trade Union Analysis of Time Study (1948, 
1955), Gomberg challenged the basic assumptions of scientific man­
agement: that management possessed the knowledge to measure ex­
pected work performance and to set scientific standards. Gomberg’s 
challenge helped unions to legitimate collective bargaining on all as­
pects of work performance.
Outside of manufacturing, Sumner Slichter (i960: 851-56) dis­
cusses far-reaching cooperative programs in the Baltimore and Ohio 
Railroad and later in the Tennessee Valley Authority, after the dams 
were built between 1933 and 1944.
In 1937, a striking innovation arose from the United Steelworkers 
Union. Joseph Scanlon, an accountant with a small steel company that
was going bankrupt, worked out a rescue plan that has come to carry 
his name ever since. “ The Scanlon Plan consists of two basic parts: (1) 
a social process whereby suggestions for productivity improvements 
can be made and carried out; (2) a formula for sharing the fruits of 
productivity improvements on a plant-wide basis” (Whyte, 1955:166). 
The plan caught on. The Union moved Scanlon to national headquar­
ters, where he helped to install the plan in a number of companies. 
Later he moved to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, where 
he continued to spread the plan with interested union leaders and 
management officials.
In some of the first Scanlon Plan cases, the formula was based on a 
ratio of labor costs to sale value of the products produced. Since that 
time, other formulas have been developed in other Scanlon Plan cases 
and in similar plans developed by other authors. (For one of the early 
cases, see Shultz and Crisara, 1952.)
The Scanlon Plan has innovative features that make it of interest to 
students and practitioners of labor relations more than a half century 
after its inception. As Scanlon and others have pointed out, the finan­
cial formula is effective only when it is combined with an active pro­
gram of worker and union leader participation in decision making. 
The switch to a plant-wide incentive system eliminates the high ad­
ministrative costs involved in maintaining systems of individual in­
centives, especially as working methods change and new rates must be 
devised. It eliminates the perceived problem of inequities when pro­
duction workers, who are on individual incentives, make more money 
than more highly skilled maintenance workers who are not on incen­
tives. It tends to eliminate one of the most frequent sources of union 
grievances: arguments over the equity of new rates established after 
management claims a “major change” in work methods has been in­
troduced. A plant-wide incentive must be renegotiated from time to 
time, but this is a collective rather than an individual problem.
Such systems fit into a pattern of mutual gains bargaining, also 
called win-win or interest bargaining, which is becoming increasingly 
popular with some unions and some managements in the 1990s.
In the 1930s and 1940s, there was a drastic change in industrial rela­
tions with the CIO drive to organize industrial unions. Franklin D. 
Roosevelt’s New Deal strengthened the ability of unions to organize 
and win representation elections. In the 1940s and 1950s, many man­
agements had not yet accepted unions, so the battles were waged on 
union drives and on management’s efforts to resist and limit as much 
as possible the rising costs of labor contracts and to erect barriers to 
protect management’s rights to determine how work should be done. 
To be sure, government efforts during World War II to foster coopera­
tion did have some temporary effects, but they faded away after the 
war, much as had the World War I efforts. The parties then turned 
their attention to working out new collective bargaining contracts.
In the 1940s and 1950s, industrial strife came to be considered the 
most serious social and economic problem the United States was fac­
ing. In response to this public concern, New York State created the 
School of Industrial and Labor Relations at Cornell University. Many 
other states followed suit, setting up centers or institutes for industrial 
relations.
The United States emerged from World War II as the world’s domi­
nant industrial power. Our allies and enemies were deeply impressed 
by our “great arsenal of democracy,” which had made the allied victory 
possible. In the 1950s, with little foreign competition, unions and 
management could agree to high wages and fringe benefits and other 
costs, and expect American consumers to pay. In industry, personnel 
officials devoted themselves to working out the fringe benefits man­
agement negotiated and administering the payment system. Except 
for those engaged in collective bargaining, personnel officials had very 
little influence on management policies and programs.
Stages of Development of Cooperative 
Union-Management Relations
For this half century, we see three stages of development, with one 
stage merging into the next.
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Stage 1: From the 1940s into the 1960s, union-management coopera­
tion was of interest to only a few academic students until the NPA fo­
cused attention through its case studies and conclusions. Supporters 
of organized labor tended to look upon those studying cooperative 
cases as simply serving management interests by reducing labor mili­
tancy. The authentic labor strategy, many felt, focused on confronta­
tion and struggle with management.
Stage 2: began in the 1970s in response to the Quality of Work Life 
(QWL) movement.
Stage 3: arose in the 1980s out of general recognition that QWL was 
not solving industrial competitiveness and job maintenance prob­
lems. This led to some new and creative ways of organizing and struc­
turing work relations.
Paradoxically, it was a public misperception of the causes of a 
highly publicized strike that fueled some of the movement from stage 
1 to stage 2. The Lordstown, Ohio, twenty-two-day strike occurred in 
a Chevrolet plant in February 1970. This plant was newly built, sup­
posedly designed for especially good working conditions as well as 
high levels of production. “ The strike was widely attributed to the 
characteristics of Lordstown’s labor force, drawn from younger people 
with higher levels of education and aspiration than the older genera­
tion. Infected by the social ferment of the times, these workers were 
not willing to accept conditions their elders had tolerated” (Whyte, 
1991:110).
On the contrary, Irving Bluestone, who was then UAW vice presi­
dent for General Motors, argued that age and education had little if 
anything to do with the strike. He pointed out that, shortly after the 
creation of the GM Assembly Division, strikes over similar issues oc­
curred in many other plants in this Division. At Lordstown the assem­
bly line moved past workers at a pace of 101 cars per hour, giving each
1 8 4  W il l ia m  Fo o te  W h y t e  a n d  Je n n ie  Fa r l e y
worker only 36 seconds to perform his or her operation. According to 
Bluestone,“this was a strike against speed-up, managements 
insistence on high speed production with insufficient manpower” 
(personal communication, 1992).
The public reaction to Lordstown focused on the misperception of 
causation and embraced the idea that the rising generation of young 
people were more critical than their elders. This focused attention on 
the need to improve the Quality of Work Life.
Shortly thereafter, Work in America (HEW, 1973) was published. Its 
surveys indicated substantial worker dissatisfaction with their work 
lives. The fact that the study was sponsored by Eliot Richardson, 
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare in the conservative ad­
ministration of Richard Nixon, signaled to the public that QWL was 
no longer a fringe issue, of concern only to radicals and academics.
In 1975, Jerry Rosow, a former personnel executive for Exxon 
and assistant secretary of labor, established the Work in America 
Institute to promote research on and practice of union-management 
cooperation.
In the early 1970s, Irving Bluestone was the only prominent labor 
leader speaking out for active programs of union-management coop­
eration. In 1972, he worked with industrialist Sidney Harman of the 
Jervis Corporation (later Harman International Industries) to estab­
lish the first joint union-management QWL process in its Bolivar, 
Tennessee, plant. Bluestone states, “ The experience gained at Bolivar 
was helpful as we proceeded to introduce the first QWL processes in a 
few of the GM plants” (personal communication).
In 1973, after several unsuccessful efforts, the LAW secured a man­
agement commitment to set up a high-level labor-management com­
mittee to stimulate and guide QWL activities in GM plants. Later a 
similar clause was negotiated with Ford, which called participatory
activities Employee Involvement (El), a term we will use for a variety 
of worker participation programs.
The spread of interest in worker participation in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s was reflected in a September 21,1981, Business Week report 
titled “Quality of Work Life: Catching On.” The writer noted that the 
first international conference on QWL in 1972 had attracted only fifty 
people, mainly academics, with no union officials and very few man­
agement people. The second international conference held in Toronto, 
ending September 3, attracted 1,500 delegates, including 200 unionists 
and 750 management people.
This management interest contrasted sharply with what we had 
seen in the 1950s. In that era most American managers thought that 
U.S. manufacturing know-how reigned supreme so there was no rea­
son to look abroad for other models. Many labor leaders implicitly ac­
cepted that view, assuming that the challenge for labor was simply to 
push management to share more of the fruits of increasing productiv­
ity and profits with workers.
By the 1980s, American managers became concerned that we were 
losing ground in international industrial competition and that they 
did not have all the answers. Labor leaders now became more critical 
of the competence of management in anything beyond buying and 
selling companies and in shutting down plants.
This shift in orientation sparked a boom in consulting for those 
who claimed to be able to get the parties to work better together and 
also opened new channels for discussion with university researchers 
who had studied the industrial relations systems. It also stimulated in­
ternational travel, particularly to Japan and Sweden (Cole, 1989).
On discovering the extraordinary spread of “quality control circles” 
in Japan, many American executives embraced this innovation, drop­
ping “control” from the title to make the Japanese invention more ac­
ceptable at home. Companies hired consultants to guide them in setting 
up and operating “quality circles,” and some also sought to recruit and 
train those who were to be organizers and trainers for the firms.
Differences in the industrial relations systems in the two countries 
had major effects on the ways in which quality circles functioned and
also on their popularity. In Japan there is not such a sharp dividing line 
between labor and management as has prevailed in the United States. 
Early in their careers, many Japanese high executives had served as 
leaders of their unions. Unions are generally organized on a company 
rather than industry basis, which helps to orient workers to company 
" interests. Japanese unions have never exercised the control over partic­
ular jobs and job responsibilities that has prevailed in unionized com­
panies in the U.S. In the leading Japanese companies, a tacit agreement 
seemed to prevail: management retained the right to determine job 
contents and rates of pay and promotions, and in return workers and 
unions gained rights to lifetime employment—an agreement that has 
been breached only in the recession of the 1990s. (It should be noted, 
however, that the employment guarantee was limited primarily to male 
workers and did not cover so-called temporary employees.)
Furthermore, in Japan QCs were introduced only after manage­
ments had taken steps to decentralize control, so that workers had been 
trained in the skills needed to manage their own work—and supervi­
sors had been trained to encourage worker participation. Along with 
this shift, supervisors worked with larger numbers of workers under 
their jurisdiction so that close supervision was no longer possible.
Whereas in Japan, QCs were controlled entirely by management, in 
the U.S., in union plants, the pattern was to establish joint union- 
management control. In fact, in cases where management appeared to 
be trying to establish management control over Els, the programs 
were quickly discredited with workers.
In this early stage of development, consultants and the parties uni­
versally accepted a set of ground rules isolating Els from collective 
bargaining and managements right to manage. The discussion groups 
were focused on shop floor problems. If anyone brought up a problem 
in the labor contract or raised a question about management preroga­
tives, he or she was told that this was out of bounds.
In the early stages of employee involvement, in most cases workers 
responded with enthusiasm. They welcomed managements apparent 
recognition that their brains could contribute to the firm. Discussion 
of shop floor problems brought to light many problems that could be
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dealt with readily. When those easy cases had been handled, the par­
ties encountered problems that could be resolved only by changes in 
the labor contract or in managerial prerogatives. When these discus­
sions were cut off, interest in El waned.
Recognition of the limited possibilities in El under the 1970 ground 
rules, plus the continued weakening of Americas international com­
petitive position, propelled some companies and unions toward stage 
3, involving an integration of El with collective bargaining. We can 
trace this particularly in the relations of Xerox and the ACTWU, a 
case studied by Cornellians over a period of years.
Xerox had begun as the Haloid Company. In the 1930s, the com­
pany was organized by the Amalgamated Clothing Workers Union 
(ACWU), which later became the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile 
Workers Union (ACTWU). Haloid executives had maintained a hos­
tile relationship to the union. The change came in this way, as de­
scribed by William S. Asher, who played a major role in industrial 
relations in Xerox from the 1950s into the 1980s:
In the late 1930s, Joseph C. Wilson, grandson o f the founder of Haloid, 
joined the company, and by the mid 1940s had become its president. Being 
o f liberal bent, a basic New Dealer, and a very pragmatic manager, he was 
convinced his relationship with the union which represented the employ­
ees had to be positive in order for the business to prosper in the long run. 
He assum ed the role of chief spokesman for the Company in collective 
bargaining with the union, and he adhered to a practice of reasonableness 
in addressing issues and demands o f the union and the employees. (Asher, 
1993)
Wilson also believed it was important to have industrial relations 
directed by people with professional training in that field. Beginning 
with Asher, the first three men hired in this field, who later became
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vice presidents for industrial relations, were graduates of Cornell’s 
School of Industrial and Labor Relations. ILR Professor Maurice 
Neufeld also served as an industrial relations advisor to both union 
and management.
For years Xerox and ACTWU had gotten along well, but their intense 
collaborative relationship did not develop until the company that 
created the copier was steadily losing market share to Japanese competi- 
' tors. In the 1970s, top management became alarmed over this trend, 
which suggested an urgent need to learn the secrets of Japanese manu­
facturing efficiency. Here Xerox had the built-in advantage of a joint 
venture (Fuji Xerox), so they had ready access to Japanese information 
and ideas on quality control circles.
Top management adopted El as a major point in the Xerox recov­
ery strategy. Personnel people familiarized themselves with the acade­
mic research reports on worker participation abroad and at home. 
They tapped the experience of other companies and unions that had 
pushed El earlier than Xerox. This sounding of experience indicated 
that about three-quarters of American quality circle programs were 
petering out after only a few years. This suggested the need to find a 
better model.
By the early 1980s, with the assistance of consultants, the parties had 
established a joint union-management El program—but still within the 
ground rules that prevailed in the 1970s. In the second year of the pro­
gram, the parties encountered a crisis that led them to break through 
these customary limits of worker participation.
Management had organized a program of competitive benchmark­
ing, looking for companies that could sell the components Xerox 
needed for less than the cost of producing them in the Xerox plants. 
Finding a vendor who offered Xerox a $3.2 million annual saving on
wire harnesses, management announced that six months later Xerox 
would close its wire harness department and lay off 180 workers.
This announcement sent shock waves through the plants. That ini­
tial layoff was bad enough, but, as management pushed competitive 
benchmarking throughout all production facilities, union leaders 
could visualize a future in which the production plants were limited to 
final assembly and refurbishing of old machines. The announcement 
also posed a threat to the El program. How could the workers be en­
couraged to achieve higher productivity when management was plan­
ning future layoffs?
At this point, El consultant/facilitator Peter Lazes assumed a lead­
ership role in urging the parties to find some alternative to layoffs. 
After some weeks of discussion with union and management officials, 
there emerged a social invention that we call the cost study team 
(CST), whose purpose would be to determine if it would be possible 
for the company to achieve a $3.2 million annual saving producing 
wire harnesses and thus keep the production in the plant.
The CST consisted of six wire harness workers, their supervisor, and 
an engineer. They would work full time for six months at their regular 
pay and would be provided with financial and engineering information 
as needed. If they failed to reach their $3.2 million savings target, Xerox 
would then be free to shut down the department. Furthermore, in look­
ing for savings, they were free to consider changes in the labor contract 
or in managerial policies and prerogatives. Of course, any changes pro­
posed by the CST would have to be later negotiated with the union and 
management.
To the surprise of management people and even some union 
officials, toward the end of the six-month period, the CST submitted a 
report documenting potential savings of $3.6 million, well beyond the 
$3.2 million target. Management’s study of the report scaled back the 
estimate somewhat, but top management agreed that the target had 
been reached, and the jobs had been saved.
In three other benchmarking cases, the CSTs either met their target 
or came close enough to persuade management to keep production 
in-house. Xerox estimates that the CST process had saved about nine
hundred jobs. This made it possible for management to agree with the 
union in the 1981 contract that no worker with at least three years’ se­
niority would be laid off—a commitment renewed in the 1986 and 
1989 contracts.
These successes had a dramatic impact on managerial views of the 
potential workers could offer the company in practical information 
and ideas. This shift in managerial orientation was evident in worker 
involvement in the planning of a new production plant and in the re­
structuring of the research and development activities. (For further in­
formation and discussion of the Xerox case, see Klingel and Martin, 
1989; Whyte et al., 1989; Whyte, 1989.)
The Xerox CSTs destroyed the 1970s ground rules for El. When the 
wire harness report came in, the parties were beginning the bargain­
ing meetings for the 1983 contract. They thus were able to work the 
changes proposed by the CST into that contract. If the CST report had 
been presented during the first few months under a three-year con­
tract, obviously the parties could not wait for years before dealing 
with its findings. When both parties agree, they can arrive at side 
agreements at any time.
The Xerox-ACTWU case seems to us to represent the development 
of a relationship of a really “creative character,” the kind hoped for by 
the authors of the N PA1953 report, but that is by no means an isolated 
case. It seems to us that the 1980s and early 1990s have been marked 
by pragmatic searches to solve mutual problems in ways that radically 
change the traditional roles of management and the union.
In many cases, we see workers and union leaders involved in deci­
sion making well beyond the day-to-day concerns of shop floor prob­
lems. Many cases could be cited to support this conclusion, but we 
shall settle for just two more: the Shell-Sarnia case and the Saturn case.
The first case involved the Shell Oil Company’s plant in Sarnia, 
Ontario (Rankin and Mansell, 1986). Here the parties arrived at agree­
ments that effectively merged collective bargaining with the day-to- 
day handling of shop floor problems and grievances. Whenever the 
parties felt that the issue under discussion indicated a need to go be­
yond the resolution of some immediate problem, they could shift
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from a grievance discussion into renegotiating some elements of the 
labor contract. In principle, the relationship allowed for negotiations 
or renegotiations to go on at any time. This added to the burden of 
time spent in meetings, but it removed the crisis atmosphere that can 
often prevail in negotiations and also encouraged the parties to adjust 
their relations to constantly changing conditions.
The Saturn case involves a partnership between General Motors and 
the UAW to form a semi-autonomous subsidiary to design, produce, 
and market a new car that would explore possibilities of going beyond 
any preexisting case in union-management cooperation and employee 
involvement (Rubinstein et al., 1993).
From the beginning stages with the launching of the GM Small Car 
Study in 1992, designed to determine how GM could compete with 
the Japanese in this field, the UAW was fully involved in every step of 
the program: joint study, agreement on the principles of organization 
and management, negotiation of a new labor contract, and technical 
and organizational training of workers and management officials. The 
engineering center is in Troy, Michigan, and the fully integrated pro­
duction plant is located in Spring Hill, Tennessee. It is important to 
note that GM did not choose this site to get away from the union. 
UAW members were the first to be hired. By the time the first car 
came off the line, for every management-level official, from the bot­
tom to the top, there was a UAW officer serving as a counterpart. With 
the guidance and advice of various joint committees, these two indi­
viduals jointly managed their unit of the company.
By 1993, it was clear that Saturn had achieved an extraordinary 
record in producing a competitively priced, high-quality car and had 
built a rapidly expanding base of customers waiting to buy Saturns 
faster than the two-shift operation could produce them. At this writ­
ing, Saturn has not yet made a profit, but it is hoped that, with the ad­
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dition of a third shift, the company will become profitable. While it is 
too early to say that GM’s gamble has paid off financially for the com­
pany, it has demonstrated the possibilities of a real partnership be­
tween management and labor to excite the interest of both students 
and practitioners of labor relations.
Employee Ownership and Union-Management Relations
In the early 1970s, when employee buyouts of plants being abandoned 
by their owners suddenly emerged as a means of saving jobs, these 
dramatic cases were the focus of increasing media attention. When 
the manager of the South Bend Lathe plant led a campaign for an 
employee buyout, he hired Norman Kurland, lawyer and management 
consultant, to handle the legal and financial arrangements. The work­
ers were organized by the United Steelworkers, and Kurland invited 
top officials of the USWA to participate in the planning to establish an 
Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP). Those officials would have 
nothing to do with ESOPs. The South Bend Lathe ESOP was struc­
tured so as to give full control to top management of the employee- 
owned company (Kurland, personal communication).
At the time, this was a typical reaction of top union leaders. The 
ESOP was something completely unfamiliar to them. A common union 
objection to the ESOPs was phrased in terms of the question, “How can 
you bargain with yourself?” Furthermore, Senator Russell Long was the 
driving force pushing the employee ownership legislation in the 1970s, 
and he was not known as a friend of labor, so it was hard for union 
leaders to imagine anything good for labor to come out of the ESOP. 
Labor leaders first assumed that the ESOP was just another device to 
promote the interests of a few top management people.
The reaction at the grassroots level was quite different. When work­
ers were facing a plant shutdown, local union officials were willing to
embrace employee ownership. Without any understanding of the em­
ployee ownership legislation or any independent expert guidance, they 
tended to follow the leadership of the proposed management of the 
new firm or of the attorneys they hired.
This pattern changed in 1980 when the leaders of the Food and 
Commercial Workers Union organized the first ESOP in a major 
meat-packing company, Rath Packing Company at Waterloo, Iowa. In 
a proposed ESOP designed to give employees 60 percent of the stock, 
in exchange for major pay and benefit concessions, the union leaders 
were determined to establish worker control of the company. When 
ILR professors Tove Hammer and Robert Stern visited Waterloo to se­
cure union cooperation on their study of worker members of boards 
of directors, they were met at the plane by Charles Mueller, chief stew­
ard. He told them that the unions negotiating committee was about to 
accept the recommendations of their union lawyer and the manage­
ment lawyer to structure the ESOP along conventional lines, with 
stock allocated according to pay and salary rates and without a trust 
enabling worker stock to be voted in a block. He was the only holdout 
in this ten-member committee. Having previously received some 
Cornell reports on ESOP cases, he asked the professors to meet with 
the negotiating committee to talk them out of the proposed plan. 
They replied that it would not be appropriate for them to get involved 
in internal union affairs, but they would be willing to meet with the 
committee and discuss what they had learned about what happened 
when the ESOP was structured along conventional lines.
After that meeting, the negotiating committee reversed itself and 
voted 10-0 to insist on some sort of democratic control. To work out 
such a plan, they hired Jack Curtis, who had formerly been Russell 
Longs assistant on the Senate Finance Committee. He crafted what 
has become known as the democratic ESOP. All stock was allocated 
on an equal basis, without regard to pay and job classification. The 
employee-owned stock was placed in a trust so that it could be voted 
in a block. The initial trustees were chosen by the union. (On the Rath 
case, see Whyte et al., 1983.)
After struggling to stay alive for five years, Rath closed in 1985, but 
the social invention of the democratic ESOP had important effects on 
the thinking of union leaders as well as students of industrial rela­
tions. Observing that the earlier ESOPs had been set up to be nar­
rowly controlled by management, union leaders now recognized that, 
whatever had been the intentions of the drafters of the legislation, the 
ESOP laws were so broadly drawn that a wide variety of arrangements 
was possible. An ideological stand for or against ESOPs made no 
sense. The task for national and regional officials was to study under 
what conditions the union should support employee ownership and 
to learn how to help local officials and members to establish the legal 
and financial conditions for a democratic ESOP.
Until the early 1980s, the employee ownership movement was di­
vided between two camps: supporters of worker cooperatives and 
supporters of ESOPs. Those committed to worker cooperatives had 
seen ESOPs as simply another way of serving the interests of man­
agers and outside stockholders. Now the Industrial Cooperative 
Association decided that they could work to establish democratic 
ESOPs. A similar convergence of views occurred on the ESOP side. 
Some of the earliest supporters of ESOPs had assumed that giving 
workers shares in ownership would automatically lead to higher pro­
ductivity and greater dedication to the company. Now they were 
learning that employee sharing in ownership by itself produced no 
such payoffs. Under such conditions, employees seemed to see the 
ESOP as just another fringe benefit and one of doubtful value. It was 
only when employee ownership was combined with an active pro­
gram of worker participation in management that the payoffs in 
morale and productivity were achieved. Now supporters of ESOPs 
were increasingly turning their attention to worker cooperatives and 
worker participation programs in private industry, to see what they 
could learn from these cases.
In the 1970s, some of us saw employee buyouts as a major means of 
saving jobs and fostering economic development. By now less opti­
mistic visions prevail. We recognize that saving jobs through an em­
ployee buyout is an uphill struggle and that probably more such
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efforts fail within a few years than succeed. On the other hand, there 
have been a few spectacular successes. Perhaps the most impressive 
case is that of Weirton Steel and its Independent Steel Workers’ Union. 
There the facilities were relatively modern, the buyout was engineered 
by a major investment banking firm, and there has been great empha­
sis upon worker and union participation—guided in this case by the 
leading union advocate of participation, Irving Bluestone, who was on 
the board of directors in the formative years of the new company.
Union-Management Cooperation in the 1990s
Union-management cooperation has been the subject of considerable 
debate within the union movement. Opponents charge that coopera­
tion involves acceptance of a policy in which management delegates 
increasing responsibilities to workers, creating an environment of 
“management by stress” (see Parker and Slaughter, 1988). This argu­
ment has been pushed particularly in the automotive companies, but 
so far this has been a minority view.
The top union leadership attitudes have changed substantially in 
recent years, but there has been no general shift in management atti­
tudes and policies. We can now see three types of management reac­
tions. At one extreme, there are companies like Xerox, Ford, General 
Motors, and Chrysler that continue to be dedicated to cooperation 
with the unions, while at the other extreme are those companies that 
have never been organized by unions or that have managed to break 
their unions so as to maintain what they call “a union-free environ­
ment.” Encouraged by the declining percentage of organized workers 
and what they see as an anti-union government policy in the 1980s, 
these managers have seen opportunities to capitalize on manage­
ment’s power advantage.
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Between the two extremes are many companies that have some 
plants organized by a union and others that are non-union. In some of 
these cases, two or more unions have organized different plants of the 
same company, which weakens the power of any one union to exercise 
pressure on management. In these companies, management will vig­
orously resist unionization of its non-union plants but may be willing 
to allow plant managers to experiment by developing cooperative 
programs in the organized plants.
Both sides recognize that unions generally have lost power in re­
cent years. Since unions can no longer force their wills on manage­
ment in most cases, what can they substitute for this lost power? 
Increasingly union leaders see cooperative programs as something of 
value they can offer management. They argue that where management 
pursues an aggressive anti-union policy, victories may cost the com­
pany more than it gains through losing the willing cooperation of 
workers and unions.
Recent studies comparing the productivity of unionized plants 
against non-union plants in the same industry suggest that unionized 
companies achieve better productivity (Mischel and Voss, 1992; Kelley 
and Harrison, 1992; Freeman and Medoff, 1984). To the extent that 
unions can demonstrate that companies derive concrete benefits from 
a cooperative relationship with the union, this recognition provides 
unions a further development of social and psychological power, be­
yond what they enjoyed in more primitive stages of cooperation.
As unions and managements work together on cooperative pro­
grams, this cooperation not only reduces the emotional heat in their 
collective bargaining; it encourages them to experiment with new 
ways of resolving problems.
Union leaders are now recognizing this enhanced power of persua­
sion. In the AFL-CIO News (March 1,1993), leaders of three major 
unions, Lynn Williams of the Steel Workers, Morton Bahr of the 
Communications Workers, and Jack Sheinkman of the Amalgamated 
Clothing and Textile Workers, made strong statements supporting a 
union-management partnership to increase U.S. industrial competi­
tiveness. Leaders of the Auto Workers and other unions have taken 
similar positions. If these union statements are matched by similar 
management statements, we may yet see the spread of the creative re­
lationships hoped for by the authors of the NPA study in the 1950s. ■
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